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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper proposes and quantitatively tests a measurement of state capacity using Robert Adcock 
and David Collier’s four-step framework. Drawing from the work of state-centered structuralists, 
rational choice-inspired theorists, as well as studies of the relationship between state and extractive 
capacity, state capacity is defined as the ability of the state to dominate, i.e. coax compliant behavior from, the 
individuals of a given territory and operationalized as tax compliance (as measured by the size of the 
shadow economy relative all legal economic activity). Large-n correlations as well as regression tests 
show that this operationalization has convergent and discriminant validity, as well as explanatory 
power. A paired comparison between China and India suggests that this operationalization is able 
to account for the differences in apparent governance capacity and development performance that 
other governance measurements cannot. 
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INTRODUCTION 
State capacity is a critical concept in political science, especially important perhaps within the good 
governance/quality of government literature. Yet there are few, if any, good measures of it. Reflect-
ing on this situation, Francis Fukuyama in a commentary in Governance called for a better concep-
tualization of governance in order to remedy the “poor state of empirical measures of the quality of 
states, that is, executive branches and their bureaucracies” (Fukuyama 2013: 347). 
Conceptualizing governance as a whole, which touches on all aspects of political power (cf. Peters 
and Pierre 2006: 209; Fukuyama 2013: 350), is an awesome task. One way to approach this is to 
break governance into its constituent parts, the making and enforcing of rules. This paper focuses 
on the latter of these, the ability of a political system to enforce rules and to deliver services, i.e. 
state capacity. 
State capacity, the “degree of control that state agents exercise over persons, activities, and re-
sources within their government’s territorial jurisdiction” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 78), is 
critical for the performance of a political system. High capacity states are able to provide public 
goods such as human security, medical and health care, and the social and physical infrastructure 
that promote human development (Rotberg 2003: 2-4). Low capacity states are limited in their abil-
ity to provide these goods, leading to low social trust (Rothstein and Stolle 2008), low development 
levels, regime, or even state failure (Rotberg 2004; Skocpol 1979). For democracy to be consoli-
dated and successful over time a high capacity state is critical (Wang 2003; Fukuyama 2005; Cf. 
Diamond 2000; Carothers 2002).   
The concept of state capacity is theoretically well developed. From Weber’s original definition of 
the state and discussion of domination (Gerth and Mills 1946: 78; Weber 1968: 53-54, 212-216), the 
theoretical nature of both have been extensively developed (cf. Mann 1984; Migdal 2001). However, 
given the importance of the concept for studies of development performance, regime-, and state 
stability, it is noteworthy that there are few, if any, cross-country measures of state capacity (Fuku-
yama 2013:353-355). 
Part of the reason why practical quantitative measurements of state capacity are few, if not non-
existent, is likely that while the background concept of state capacity is widely accepted, scholars 
working in different traditions use different terminology that reflect subtle conceptual differences. 
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For example, state power (Skocpol 1979; Mann 1984; Tilly 1991; Mann 1984), state strength (Mig-
dal 2004), state capacity (Hui 2005; Fukuyama 2013), and (government) effectiveness (Rothstein 
2011) all describe the same background concept, i.e. the ability of states to implement policy, but 
reflect differences in systematized conceptualization. 
Measurement validity, "whether operationalization and the scoring of cases adequately reflect the 
concept the researcher seeks to measure" (Adcock and Collier 2001: 529), is dependent on the sys-
tematized concept, which is derived from the background concept. Scholars whose work is largely 
qualitative and theoretical tend to have more clearly defined systematized concepts, whereas more 
quantitatively focused scholars use or create measurements or approximations of state capacity that 
are based on unclear systematized conceptualizations. The disjuncture between qualitative and the-
oretical on the one hand and quantitative on the other is not conducive for the creation of indica-
tors with measurement validity. 
The lack of a valid measurement of state capacity is especially problematic for the good govern-
ance/quality of government literature that is marked by quantitative analysis. One of the most 
common indicators of the state's capacity to implement policy, the Government Effectiveness 
(GE), one of the six World Bank Governance Indicators (WGI) which have received considerable 
scholarly criticism (Kurtz and Schrank 2007; Arndt 2008; Andrews 2008; Pollitt 2008; Thomas 
2010; Langbein and Knack 2010).1 The most powerful criticism of the WGI is that they are atheo-
retical (Andrews 2008; Arndt 2008), and lack measurement validity (Thomas 2010; cf. Adcock and 
Collier 2001). In a defense of the WGI the principal authors argue that a lack of definitional con-
sensus means that they are free to propose their own definitions (Kaufmann, Kray, and Mastruzzi 
2010a: 56). This defense however misses the point. Aggregating existing indicators and then theo-
retically defining the new index precludes the possibility of measurement validity; for the WGI to 
have measurement validity, the process would have to be reversed. Without measurement validity 
the analyses using GE, or any other WGI, are problematic because it is unclear what a key indicator 
is actually a measure of. 
The purpose of this paper is to test an indicator of governance, state capacity, that has measure-
ment validity. Drawing from the work of state-centered structuralists (Tilly 1992; Hui 2005), ra-
                                                      
1 For summaries of criticisms against the WGI, cf. Pollitt 2009 and Apaza 2009.  
2 In later writings Easton replaced ‘government’ with ‘political authorities’ (1965;1975), which in recent literature seems 
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tional choice-inspired theorists (Levi 1981; 1988), as well as studies of the relationship between 
state and extractive capacity (Wang and Hu 2001; cf. Wang 2001), state capacity is defined as the 
ability of the state to dominate, i.e. coax compliant behavior from, the individuals of a given territory and opera-
tionalized as tax compliance (as measured by the size of the shadow economy relative all legal eco-
nomic activity). Large-n correlations as well as regression tests show that this operationalization has 
convergent and discriminant validity, as well as explanatory power. A paired comparison between 
China and India suggests that this operationalization is able to account for some of the differences 
in development performance that other measurements can not (cf. Fukuyama 2013: Appendix). In 
other words, state capacity as measured by tax compliance has measurement validity and is analyti-
cally useful.  
The structure of this paper follows the Adcock and Collier framework (Adcock and Collier 2001: 
531) for testing indicators. First, the basic concept, the "broad constellation of meanings and un-
derstandings associated with" the state, is discussed. Second, the concept is systematized, i.e. the 
background concept is distilled down to "a specific formulation" and defined explicitly. Third, the 
systematized concept is operationalized. Finally, the scores produced by the operationalization are 
tested on a number of cases. This process is followed to ensure that the proposed indicator has 
measurement validity, which is "achieved when scores (including the results of qualitative classifica-
tion) meaningfully capture the ideas contained in the corresponding concept" (Adcock and Collier 
2010:530). 
 
BACKGROUND CONCEPT 
Before state capacity can be systematically conceptualized in a definition, the basis for the opera-
tionalization, the background concept must be reviewed. A comprehensive state of the field that 
accounts for all approaches to the study of the state is beyond the scope of this paper so the focus 
of this section will be on three core issues. The first issue is the nature of the state and social domi-
nation. The second issue is the state's relationship to other forces. This third issue is how to under-
stand the role of the state in a political system, i.e. does it describe the whole or is merely one part? 
While a treatment of these issues might seem an unnecessary excursus for what is ultimately a quan-
titative study, the background concept forms the basis for the systematized concept. Omitting or 
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glossing over this part in favor of quantitative tests would not produce an improvement over pre-
sent indicators. 
This first issue is the nature of the state and social domination. The classical definition of the state 
is Weber’s, that it is “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of physical force within a given territory” (Gerth and Mills 1946: 78). This pithy formulation is 
however the introduction to a more nuanced discussion wherein the state is described as a "relation 
of men dominating men ... [I]f a state is to exist, the dominated must obey the authority claimed by 
the powers that be." (Gerth and Mills 1946: 78). While this relation is supported by violence, what 
characterizes it is social domination not violence. Domination (Herrschaft) is "the probability that a 
command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons" (Weber 1968: 
53). The measure of domination is compliance; the nature of the state is a domination that pro-
duces compliance within a given territory. 
According to Weber domination rests on two pillars, the inner justification (i.e. legitimacy) as well 
as the external means. These two pillars have inspired two complementing lines of research. Using 
a rational choice approach focused on the individual citizen (cf. Levi 1988:185-204), Margaret Levi 
has studied the intimately related quasi-voluntary compliance, consent, and legitimacy (Levi 1988; 
1997; 2009). By contrast, the scholars associated with the ‘Bringing the State Back In’ (BTSBI) 
movement (cf. Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985) have generally focused on the means by 
which the state sustains itself (cf. Skocpol 1979: 29; Tilly 1992). These lines of research intersect the 
most clearly in the focus on the state as an aggregator of resources. Levi’s point of departure is the 
“major limitation on rule is revenue” (Levi 1988: 1). Charles Tilly’s argument that “war made the 
state, and the state made war (Tilly 1975: 42) is less about war and more how the efforts of Euro-
pean rulers to mobilize more and more resources fundamentally transformed their polities. The 
social domination that the state represents is based on and manifested in the mobilization of men 
and money. 
The second issue is the state's relationship to other forces. There are two aspects of this issue. The 
first aspect is how autonomous the state is. The second aspect is what actors the state interacts with. 
With regards to the autonomy of the state Michael Mann has argued that the power of the state and 
its elites is not unidimensional. According to Mann despotic power, “the range of actions which the 
[state] elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil soci-
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ety groups”, is distinct from infrastructural power, “the capacity of the state actually to penetrate 
civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm” (Mann 1984: 
113). Despotic power, the power of the state elite over society is shallow, and allows for autonomy 
but is not able to transform society. Infrastructural power by contrast is deep, transformative, but 
also limiting as it creates or strengthens countervailing civil societies group. While some of the his-
torical examples of despotic power are arguable, considered as ideal types the two are analytically 
useful. The idea of infrastructural power agrees with the idea of the state-society bargain, wherein 
states must engage with society in return for invasive mobilization of its resources (Tilly 1992: 99-
103; Hui 2005: 170-177). The state is not autonomous, but of rather than above society. 
The second aspect of the state’s relationship to other forces is what actors the state interacts with. 
Scholars working from Weber’s definition of the state tend to conceive it as distinct and separate 
from an often undifferentiated civil society. Based on studies of state-society relations in the (so-
called) Third World Joel Migdal argues against this conceptualization (1988), proposing in its stead 
the ‘state-in-society model’ (Migdal 2004). The state is one actor among the many social forces that 
seek to "mobilize followers and exercise power" (Migdal 1994: 20-21; Cf. Migdal 2004, 49-50). The 
interaction between state and social forces can according to Migdal produce four outcomes. The 
first is a total transformation of society, as the state’s penetration leads to the subjugation of social 
forces and the state’s domination. The second is state incorporation of existing social forces, as the 
state appropriates existing social forces, but is in the act also transformed by them. The third out-
come is the incorporation of existing social forces into the state, as existing dominant social forces 
adapt to the state’s presence and thereby prevents radical changes in the pattern of domination. 
Finally, the state might altogether fail in penetrating society, with little transformative effect upon 
either society or itself (Migdal 2004: 126-128). The state must compete and contend with a multi-
tude of forces that seek to affect it or achieve independent domination; the domination of the state 
is neither complete not a given but should be considered on a scale. 
The third issue is how to understand the role of the state in a political system, i.e. does it describe 
the whole or is it merely one part. Most studies of the state, especially those by the state-centered 
structuralists associated with the BTSBI-movement, tend to describe the state holistically, e.g. as the 
"set of organizations invested with the authority to make binding decisions for people and organi-
zations juridically located in a particular territory and to implement these decisions using, if neces-
sary, force" (Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985: 46-47). This description is not dissimilar to how the 
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word 'government' is sometimes used in other literatures to describe a whole political system (e.g. 
the good governance/quality of government literature, cf. Rothstein 2009). These all-encompassing 
terms are analytically problematic. For it to be studied the state (i.e. the political system) has to be 
disaggregated (Migdal 1994: 15). 
Migdal proposes a four-level taxonomy of the state, but there is already a widely accepted alterna-
tive. Though it is some ways removed from the study of the state, David Easton's tripartite division 
of the political system into government, regime, and the political community is applicable and ana-
lytically useful (Easton 1957).2 A government is the group of leaders responsible for making politi-
cal decisions, i.e. a presidential administration, the party or coalition of parties controlling the prime 
ministry, or the party leadership in a one-party system. Regime describes “the formal and informal 
organization of the centre of political power “ (Fishman 1990: 428; cf. Easton 1957: 392). Political 
community is sometimes interpreted as nation (Norris 1999: 10; Dalton 2004: 5) but state seems 
more accurate.3 State indicates the entity that holds a monopoly on the legitimate violence and ad-
ministers a territory. 
In this taxonomy government is the least permanent feature of the political system and in democra-
cies changes as a matter of course. Regimes may change without a complete breakdown of social 
order whereas state failure is associated with widespread violence and unlawful or lawless behavior 
(Lawson 1993; Rotberg 2004:2-3). This does not contradict the description of the state as a set of 
organizations. Rather, the organizations and institutions in a political system should be grouped 
according to function for the sake of analytical clarity. 
 
SYSTEMATIZED CONCEPT  
Based on the background concept in the previous section – the nature of the state, its relationship 
to other social actors, and the part it plays in the political system – state capacity is defined as the 
ability of the state to dominate, i.e. coax compliant behavior from, the individuals of a given territory. This is in line 
with McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly’s definition (2001: 78). Domination as such is neutral as to wheth-
                                                      
2 In later writings Easton replaced ‘government’ with ‘political authorities’ (1965;1975), which in recent literature seems 
to describe what Easton originally meant by the word government (e.g. Dalton 2004:6-7).  
3 As an imagined community (cf. Anderson 2006), not seldom the product of the state (cf. Weber 1976), nation is a 
problematic interpretation of political community. Interpreting it as the state (as Pippa Norris also seems to do; cf. Weber 
1968:901ff) has better support. 
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er compliance is voluntary or non-voluntary and the extent to which citizen compliance is voluntary 
is outside of the scope of this paper. However, the preponderance of theory, as well as history, 
would suggest that voluntary compliance (such as produced by democracy in the West, cf. Tilly 
1992; Hui 2005) is more efficient, and more effective (Levi et al. 2009: 354-5).  
While this domination might ultimately rest on the capacity for violence, in practice it is not the 
product of force but some generally accepted claim to legitimacy that promotes voluntary compli-
ance. This legitimacy could be described in the form of one of Weber’s ideal types, dependent on 
contingent consent (Levi 1997), the product of a state-society bargain, an expression of infrastruc-
tural power, or “an acceptance of the state’s rules of the game, its social control, as true and right” 
(Migdal 2004: 52). 
The domination of the state is limited in that the state does not make policy. Rather, it is at least 
formally the tool by which government implements the policies it formulates.4 While the ability to 
dominate the individuals of a given territory might sound ominous, if not contradictory to the idea 
of democracy, a consolidated democratic regime requires it (Wang 2003; Fukuyama 2005; Cf. Dia-
mond 2000; Carothers 2002). Through policy successive governments can strengthen the state, or 
weaken it (cf. Tilly 1992; Hui 2005). 
 
OPERATIONALIZATION 
From the systematized conceptualization of state capacity, compliance is the most straightforward 
indicator of that capacity. High capacity states should be able to ensure higher levels of compliance 
than low capacity states. There are many forms of compliant behaviors that could be used as an 
indicator of state capacity, but compliance with state efforts to mobilize resources stands out in the 
literature on the state. Domination is an expensive enterprise that requires men and money, and the 
level of resource mobilization by the state determines its capacity for it (Fukuyama 2011: 470; cf. 
Levi 1988: 1). 
                                                      
4 The fact that some bureaucracies, such as MITI (Johnson 1982), are able to formulate policy does not mean they are 
formally superior to government.  
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A common approach to measuring the capacity of a state is to look at the amount of taxes it col-
lects (Fukuyama 2013: 353; Lieberman 2002; Cf. Persson 2008: 30-33). This approach has merit. 
The history of state formation in Europe and China is the history of the state increasing its scope to 
more effectively mobilize resources. Put differently, states can be broken down into a number of 
logical functions that are mutually supportive. For an effective monopoly of violence (coercive 
function) the military and police need to have resources extracted from society (extractive function), 
be supported by effective bureaucracies that coordinate with other elements of the state that also 
constrain them (control function), and operate in a society with some level of consent (legitimation 
function); “the state’s capacity to mobilize and extract financial resources is the core of state capac-
ity and the foundation for the state’s ability to realize its other capacities” (Wang and Hu 2001: 27; 
Cf. Levi 1988:1). Along the same line, Schumpeter famously argued that the “public finances are 
one of the best starting points for an investigation of society, especially though not exclusively of its 
political life” (Schumpeter 1991: 101). 
Though measuring state capacity by taxation as a percentage of the economy is perhaps the most 
straightforward approach, it nevertheless has several caveats (Cf. Fukuyama 2013: 353-355). First, it 
measures not only the capacity to tax, but also the willingness. As such it captures policy as much as 
capacity to implement the policy, and is therefore not a measure of state capacity. 
Second, natural resource rents makes taxation too easy in some countries. This breaks the theoreti-
cal relationship between the different state functions as elites in such countries need only enough 
coercive capacity to guard the resources, which reduces the need for a well-rounded state that gen-
erates consent through social control and performance. It is not easy to compensate for the exist-
ence of such resource rents in global taxation statistics, which reduces their explanatory potential. 
Finally, taxation as a percentage of the economy is ultimately a measure of the comparatively easy 
collection of taxes, not the more difficult registration and regulation of the economy that requires 
social control and the provision of public goods. Between 1999 and 2007 the average size of the 
shadow economy, the legal production of goods and services that are concealed from authorities, 
across 162 countries was about one third of the official economy (Schneider, Buehn and Montene-
gro 2010). This discrepancy between the official economy, which is used for tax assessment, and 
the much larger actual economy makes taxation as a measure of state capacity problematic. 
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As an operationalization of state capacity tax compliance has more merit than simple extraction. 
First, it measures extractive capacity only, not tax policy. Second, it removes the problem of having 
to compensate for resource rents. Finally, it measures the capacity of the state to penetrate society 
and regulate the economy. It is a measure of the ability of the state to dominate, i.e. coax compliant 
behavior from, the individuals of a given territory. 
There are a number of approaches to measuring the tax compliance. One would be to aggregate 
national statistics on tax compliance, which is often collected by national tax agencies. There are 
two caveats to this. First, tax evasion is not uniformly defined. Second, it is not clear that the organ-
ization whose job it is to assess economic activity is any better at assessing its failure to do so. Ano-
ther approach would be to use a uniform methodology to evaluate tax compliance in all countries, 
and hope that one could do a better job than the individual tax agencies. Finally, one could use 
existing research on the shadow economy.  
The shadow economy is the aggregate of the legal economic activities that should be included in the National 
Income Accounts, but because of evasive strategies are not; “these market economies are connected with the 
evasion of taxes and social security contributions, as well as the avoidance of regulations (official 
working time, safety regulations), and social security fraud” (Schneider and Enste 2013: 9-10). The 
shadow economy excludes financial transaction tax evasion, which is often hard to distinguish from 
legal tax avoidance, and the informal sector that is often not taxed (Schneider and Enste 2013: 9-
10). Legal economic activities are distinct from illegal activities in that the former are sanctioned by 
law when reported and regulated, whereas the latter are not sanctioned under any circumstance. 
Selling food or painting someone’s home would be examples of legal economic activities, whereas 
selling drugs or engaging in prostitution are (generally) illegal economic activity. 
Measuring the size of the shadow economy is in some ways similar to measuring a black hole in 
that its existence and size must imputed from what is measurable. There are three approaches to 
doing this: the direct, the indirect, and the model (Schneider and Hofreither 1986: 18-19; Schneider 
and Enste 2013). 
The direct approach, using surveys and point (tax) audits to infer the size of the shadow economy, 
has a number of drawbacks, such as the representativeness of the surveyed population being un-
clear and that it is very costly. It is not something that can be funded on any larger scale by anything 
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else than a (truly dedicated) national state. For large-n global comparisons this approach is of lim-
ited usefulness. 
The indirect approach, comparing economic indicators to estimate the shadow economy, is a col-
lection of approaches that all have their strengths and weaknesses. A common weakness is that it is 
a comparison of two or more possible incorrect measurements to determine a third. This adds a 
layer of complexity that is potentially problematic. 
The model approach uses a model to calculate the (unobservable) size of the shadow economy 
based on a number of causes and indicators. This is the model favored by Friedrich Schneider, 
Andreas Buehn, and Claudio Montenegro (2010) and Friedrich Schneider and Dominik Enste 
(2013).5 Based on 25-years of research, in Schneider et al.’s model the causes are the size of actual 
and perceived direct and indirect taxation, regulatory burden, tax morale, and income. The indica-
tors in the model are monetary indicators, labor market development, and production market de-
velopment. 
Schneider et al. (2010; 2013) calculate the size of shadow economy as a percentage of the official 
economy, i.e. the legal economic activity accounted for in national statistics. For example, the shad-
ow economy was in the five-year period between 2003 and 2007 on average 34.3 percent of the 
official economy in Albania. This data makes it possible to calculate the tax compliance of citizens 
engaging in legal economic activity. Between 2003 and 2007 the Albanian state was only able to 
regulate, and thereby tax, about 75 percent of legal economic activity. On a scale from 0 to 1, the 
tax compliance in Albania was 0.748.  
The resultant index of state capacity is prima facie reasonable (appendix A). The top-10 countries are 
Switzerland, United States, Luxembourg, Austria, Japan, Macao (China), New Zealand, United 
Kingdom, China, and Singapore. With the possible exception of China, which is discussed in 
greater depth below, these are all polities that could be expected to top an index of state capacity. 
Some countries such as Sweden or Denmark are lower on the index than might be expected given 
their scores on other governance indices. This is cause for continued study, but for now the validity 
tests of the index suggests that it is generally correct. Furthermore, given that apparent overall va-
lidity of tax compliance as a measure of state capacity, it is possible that some of the discrepancy 
                                                      
5 For an in-depth discussion, cf. Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro 2010 and Schneider and Enste 2013. 
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between this index and other indices reflects the fact that most governance indicators are either 
very broad and/or perception-based. 
The systematized conceptualization of state capacity - the ability of the state to dominate, i.e. coax compli-
ant behavior from, the individuals of a given territory - is operationalized as tax compliance. Tax compliance 
is calculated from the size of the shadow economy as a percentage of all legal economic activity. 
 
VALIDITY TESTS 
Testing Design and Data Sources 
Having created a systematized concept from the background concept, and then operationalized the 
systematized concept, the validity of the resultant indicators needs to be tested. The purpose of the 
validity testing is to verify that “the indicator employed produces scores that can be interpreted as 
adequately capturing the systematized concept” (Adcock and Collier 2001: 533). Testing the validity 
of an indicator meant to capture something as intangible as state capacity presents a challenge. In 
this paper validity is tested three ways. The first two tests are quantitative, and the final is qualitative. 
First, convergent validity and discriminant validity are tested. Because there is no “true” measure 
against which to assess validity, a number of related indicators are used (cf. Adcock and Collier 
2001: 541). Governance indicators which were designed to capture concepts theoretically close to 
state capacity, an indicator that measures state provision of public goods, as well as an indicator 
(level of democracy) that is weakly related to state capacity are correlated against the proposed indi-
cator.6 For the proposed indicator of state capacity to be valid, the governance-related indicators 
should be highly correlated, the outcome-related variable should be somewhat less highly correlated 
(as it also captures policy), and the democracy measure should be weakly related. This outcome 
would demonstrate convergent and discriminant validity. 
Second, the proposed indicator is used in a regression analysis as one of several independent varia-
bles. The dependent variable is development as measured by the UN’s Human Development Index 
                                                      
6 The relationship between democracy and state capacity is weak in the sense that while state capacity is a prerequisite 
for consolidated democracy, non-democratic regimes can be consolidated and democracy per se does not appear to 
produce state capacity.  
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(HDI). Human development, as measured by the HDI, is a product of the willingness of govern-
ment and the capacity of the state to provide public goods. Research on good governance/quality 
of government is generally focused on explaining and finding the factors that drive development. 
As such this is a test of the usefulness of the state capacity indicator to such analysis. The indicator 
should ideally have some explanatory power when other indicators that are known to promote 
development are controlled for. The level of explanatory power is not as important as the existence 
of a statistically significant effect; the value of the proposed indicator lies in its measurement validi-
ty, not correlation with outcome. 
Finally, the indicator is used in the critical case of China and India’s development performance. 
There is an incongruence between the development performance, the hall-mark of ‘good govern-
ance’, in China and the country’s low scores on various governance measures (Mahbunani 2013; 
Rothstein 2012: 3; Cf. Fukuyama 2013: 366). China often scores worse than India on these 
measures, even though its development performance has been consistently better since the found-
ing of the respective countries. This makes China along with India a critical case in the negative 
sense; the proposed operationalization should ideally by able to account for some China’s apparent 
capacity to provide public goods. 
With the exception of the shadow economy all variables used in the quantitative tests are from the 
University of Gothenburg Quality of Government Institute Standard Dataset (Teorell et al. 2013). 
The institute is an independent research institute within the Department of Political Science at the 
University of Gothenburg and it maintains a number of datasets on various aspects of governance. 
All variables in the quantitative analysis are from the May 2013 QoG dataset. Except for the shad-
ow economy and the historical HDI control variable, the data is generally for 2009-2010. For the 
qualitative test data is drawn mainly from UN sources, such as the 2010 Human Development Re-
port. 
Because the West tends to be a statistical outlier the quantitative tests break out results for the West 
and the world outside of the West. 
Indicators 
Tax compliance rates are calculated from the size of the shadow economy in different countries 
(Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro 2010). While newer data can be found in Schneider and Enste 
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2013, the country coverage is better in Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro 2010. The methodology 
appears unchanged between the two, and there does not appear to be significant differences be-
tween them (r=0.971). The shadow economy is measured as a percentage of the official economy, 
and this is used to calculate the tax compliance rates of all legal economic activity. The resultant 
index is from 0 to 1 where higher numbers mean greater tax compliance. The mean value is 0.760 
for the world (n=160),7 and 0.859 for the West (n=23). 
The governance indicators are drawn from the ICRG Quality of Government (QoG), TI’s Corrup-
tion Perception Index (CPI), as well as the WGI. These are designed to measure aspects of govern-
ance that should correlate highly with high levels of state capacity, such as low levels of corruption, 
rule of law, and effective bureaucracy. Of the tested indicators GE, which captures “perceptions of 
the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
the government's commitment to such policies”, is perhaps conceptually the closest to state capaci-
ty. It is often used as a stand-in for state capacity, and it could be expected to have one of the high-
est correlations with state capacity operationalized as tax compliance. 
QoG is a composite of three dimensions -- corruption, law and order, and the quality of the bu-
reaucracy -- that capture the functioning of a state. Scores are on a scale from 0 to 1, where higher 
values indicate higher quality of government. Globally the mean is 0.53 (n=139), and 0.86 (n=23) in 
the West. 
TI’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) captures perceptions of corruption in the public sector 
where corruption is defined as the abuse of public office for private gain. Scores range between 0 
and 10, where higher numbers indicate lower perceptions of corruption. The global mean score is 
3.98 (n=181), and the Western mean is 7.65 (n=23). 
The six WGI capture perceptions of fundamental governance concepts that the authors argue are 
related to development outcomes, “such as higher per capita incomes, lower infant mortality, and 
higher literacy” (Kaufmann, Kray and Zoido-Lobatón 1999: 4; Cf. Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi 2010b: 20). They should therefore be directly related to development outcome as meas-
ured by the HDI, and indeed the average of the WGI correlates highly with human development 
                                                      
7
 Hong Kong and Macao are not sovereign states, and therefore not included in the world average. 
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level (r=0.787). Using a survey-of-surveys approach, the indicators are aggregates of various per-
ception-based indices and do not measure governance directly. The scale is from about -2.5 to 2.5 
and higher values indicate better performance. The six indicators of the WGI measure three aspects 
of governance (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010b: 4): 
a) The process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced: 
• Voice and accountability 
• Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 
b) The capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies: 
• Government Effectiveness 
• Regulatory Quality 
c) The respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social in-
teractions among them: 
• Rule of Law 
• Control of Corruption 
Empirically, there seems to be little real-world difference between the four of the six indicators as 
the correlation between GE, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption is very 
high at r>0.92. It stands to reason that perceptions of a polity’s ability to formulate and implement 
sound policy should correlate highly with the respect of the citizenry for the institutions that govern 
economic and social interactions. However, the high correlation has drawbacks and not all WGI are 
used in the validity tests. The mean of the WGI Average is -0.07 for the world (n=191), and 1.41 
for the West (n=25). 
The HDI uses a simple model of human development based on three components: longevity, edu-
cation and a decent living standard (UNDP 1990: 12; UNDP 2010: 13-15). It is a well-rounded 
measure of a country’s development level, reflecting both willingness of government as well as the 
ability of the state to provide public goods.  It is on a scale from 0 to 1, where higher is better. The 
HDI mean is 0.66 for the world (n=185), and 0.88 for the West (n=25). 
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There appears to be a level of path dependency to human development trends, at least on a region-
al level. Development performance over time shows that relative development levels of regions are, 
excepting East Asia, stable (UNDP 2010: 56). There is a natural lag in the dimensions that consti-
tute the index as the average life expectancy, education level, and income of a population cannot be 
changed overnight. To account for the importance of historic development levels the 1970-1974 
average HDI score is used as a control variable in the regression. 
Freedom House/Imputed Polity is used as a measure of democracy. The scale is from 0 to 10, 
where 10 is the most democratic. The mean is 6.29 for the world (n=162), and 9.92 for the West 
(n=27). 
Finally, in the quantitative analyses the Teorell and Hadenius 2005 politico-geographical classifica-
tion of world regions is used to identify Western countries. The West, category 5, includes Western 
Europe, North America, as well as Australia and New Zealand (but not Cyprus), 27 countries in all 
(Teorell and Hadenius 2005; Teorell et al 2013). 
Some indicators have also been normalized for the regression analysis. The descriptive statistics of 
all variables are in table 1.  
  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of all variables. 
Source: Teorell et al. 2013; Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro 2010. 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std..Deviation
State.Capacity.(Tax.Compliance) 160 0.61 0.92 0.7601 0.07184
ICRG.Indicator.of.Quality.of.Government 139 0.08 1.00 0.5323 .20281
TI.Corruption.Perceptions.Index 181 1.01 9.40 3.9829 2.08954
WGI.Average 191 ,2.41 1.86 ,0.0714 .90112
WGI.Average..(Normalized) 191 0.00 1.00 0.5477 .21103
WGI.Control.of.Corruption 191 ,1.73 2.48 ,0.0648 1.00182
WGI.Government.Effectiveness 191 ,2.27 2.29 ,0.0625 .99270
WGI.Government.Effectiveness.(Normalized) 191 0.00 1.00 0.4841 .21770
WGI.Political.Stability 193 ,3.32 1.57 ,0.0596 1.00197
WGI.Rule.of.Law 193 ,2.49 1.97 ,0.0724 .99283
WGI.Regulatory.Quality 191 ,2.56 1.91 ,0.0750 .99079
WGI.Voice.and.Accountability 193 ,2.24 1.57 ,0.0575 1.01309
Freedom.House/Imputed.Polity 193 0.00 10.00 6.6731 3.10514
Freedom.House/Imputed.Polity..(Normalized) 193 0.00 1.00 0.6673 .31051
Human.Development.Index 185 0.28 0.94 0.6555 .17333
Historical.HDI.(1970R74) 134 0.15 0.81 0.5435 .18466
Valid.N.(listwise) 113
Descriptive.Statistics
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Quantitative Tests 
Convergent and Discriminant Validity Test 
For the operationalization of state capacity as tax compliance to be valid it should correlate highly 
with related governance variables, somewhat weaker with development performance, and weakly 
with democracy level. The four governance variables that are included in the correlation test are the 
ICRG QoG, the TI Corruptions Index, the average of the six WGI, as well as the WGI GE. The 
outcome variable is the HDI. Freedom House/Imputed Polity measures level of democracy.  
The results are largely as theory would suggest, and the proposed indicator appears to have both 
convergent as well as discriminant validity (table 2).  
For the world (column I) as a whole the correlation between tax compliance and the governance 
variables are between .773 for QoG, and .693 for the WGI Average. That the weakest relationship 
is between tax compliance and the WGI Average stands to reason as it is conceptually the most 
confused. The relationship between tax compliance and development level is somewhat weaker 
than that between tax compliance and various governance indicators (.629). 
At .271 the weakest relationship is between tax compliance and democracy level. The correlation 
between the other governance indicators and democracy level is .493 (QoG) between .661 (WGI 
Average). Tax compliance seems to capture state capacity more narrowly than the other governance 
Table 2. The correlations are in the directions that theory suggests. 
Source: Teorell et al. 2013; Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro 2010. 
World World Excl. West West Only
State Capacity State Capacity State Capacity
I II III
.773** .638** .629**
.000 .000 .001
.722** .536** .704**
.000 .000 .000
.693** .495** .613**
.000 .000 .002
.737** .581** .595**
.000 .000 .003
.629** .474** .445*
.000 .000 .033
.271** -.011 .517*
.002 .912 .012
N=133 N=110 N=23
ICRG Indicator of Quality of
Government
TI Corruption Perceptions Index
WGI Average
Correlations between State Capacity and other Indicators
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
WGI Government Effectiveness
Human Development Index
Freedom House/Imputed Polity
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indicators that capture also the distinct concept of democracy. Tax compliance thus appears to 
have discriminant validity. 
Outside of the West (column II) the general strength of the relationships hold true. Governance 
indicators correlate the strongest with the shadow economy, and human development level is 
somewhat weaker. The relationship between democracy level and state capacity as measured by the 
shadow economy breaks down completely outside of the West, and is in fact no longer significant. 
A case could be made for a quadratic, as opposed to linear, relationship between democracy level 
and state capacity where consolidated democracies and non-democracies have high state capacity. 
Regime consolidation is difficult in weak states, and the countries where neither form of regime is 
consolidated (i.e. the countries which exist in what Thomas Carothers (2001) calls the Gray Zone) 
are consequently those with the lowest tax compliance. 
Focusing only on Western countries (column III) the relationship between tax compliance and 
related governance indicators is strong as expected. The relationship between tax compliance and 
human development level is somewhat weaker, also as expected. The comparatively strong relation-
ship between tax compliance and democracy level can be explained by the outliers. The only West-
ern countries not to score a 10 on the Freedom House/Imputed Polity index are France, Belgium, 
Italy, and Greece. As a group these countries have somewhat lower tax compliance than the majori-
ty of the rest of the countries. That tax compliance correlates with level of democracy could be seen 
as support of, or at least in line with, the European state-society bargain whereby citizens were 
offered democracy in return for more invasive resource mobilization (cf. Tilly 1992). 
Across the world tax compliance correlates highest with the measurements that are closest to the 
ability of the state to coax compliance, i.e. the QoG (which should capture level of corruption, law 
and order, and the quality of the bureaucracy), corruption, and government effectiveness, and 
somewhat weaker with the more all-encompassing WGI average. The convergent validity of tax 
compliance as an operationalization of state capacity appears to be good. Without more precise 
alternative measures of state capacity, discriminant validity is harder to conclusively establish. How-
ever, higher correlations for QoG and GE than the more expansive WGI, lower correlation with 
HDI, and quite low correlation with democracy level in the world (especially compared to other 
governance indicators) support the discriminant validity of tax compliance. 
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Explanatory Power 
For the operationalization of state capacity as tax compliance to be useful, it should have some 
explanatory power when other indicators that are known to promote development are controlled 
for. In theory state capacity determines the ability of the state to produce public goods, such securi-
ty, education, and health care. The capacity to provide these goods is however distinct from the 
political willingness to do so. As an ultimate rather than proximate determinant of human devel-
opment the effect of state capacity on development should be significant, but the relationship 
should not be perfectly linear. 
State capacity is used as an independent variable in a correlation and regression where development 
is the dependent variable. The other independent variables are democracy, government effective-
ness (GE), and good governance (here operationalized using the average of the WGI) - all common 
factors in models of development. Historical development levels are also included because of their 
influence on present-day development levels. 
Tax compliance, HDI, and the historical HDI are all on a scale of 0 to 1, where higher values are 
better. GE, the average of the WGI, and the Freedom House/Imputed Polity democracy measure 
were normalized so that the scale is the same for all variables. 
The chosen indicators are, with the exception of Freedom House/Imputed Polity, strongly corre-
lated with human development (table 3). In the world as a whole and the world excluding the west 
(column I and II) the relationships are generally the same. Historical HDI level is highly correlated 
Table 3. With the exception of democracy level, the independent variables correlate highly with human development. 
Source: Teorell et al. 2013; UNDP 2010; Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro 2010. 
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with present-day development. In the world as a whole this relationship is almost perfectly linear. 
Conversely, the relationship between level of democracy and human development is comparatively 
weak. The average of the WGI and the WGI are highly correlated with human development. Given 
the origin of the WGI this stands to reason. State capacity is also highly correlated with human 
development, but not as highly as the conceptually more expansive WGI. 
Looking at the relationships between the various indicators and human development in the West 
(column III) relationships are weaker, and the significance is for all indicators, outside of historical 
HDI level, lower. The small number of cases, only 22 for the West, limits the conclusions that can 
be drawn about the difference between the West and the rest of the world. What is important is 
that the general relationship appears to hold true even in the West. 
Using the same indicators in a regression analysis (except for GE whose correlation with tax com-
pliance is too high), where the effect of the individual indicators on human development are con-
trolled for, changes the results somewhat (table 4).8 The effect of historical development levels is 
strong, and significant across the world, whether the West is included or not. Level of democracy, 
                                                      
8 The very high R2-value is because of the inclusion of historical HDI-data in the regression analysis. Removing histori-
cal HDI-data reduces the R2 to 0.631. It was included because of the high correlation between present-day and historical 
development-level. 
Table 4. When the WGI and historical HDI have been controlled for the shadow economy variable has an impact on the development level of a 
country. 
Source: Teorell et al. 2013; UNDP 2010; Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro 2010. 
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at least as measured by the Freedom House/Imputed Polity index, loses in significance and its ef-
fect is (negative and) negligible when other factors are controlled for.   
In the world as a whole the effect of state capacity on human development is strong, .273 and sig-
nificant (column I). Removing the West increases the impact of state capacity, to .348, and the re-
sult is still significant at the 0.01 level (column II). The effect of WGI also increases somewhat with 
the West removed from the universe of analyzed cases. 
Looking specifically at the West (column III) all indicators except for historical development level 
lose significance completely. The why of these results are outside the scope of this study, but they 
are suggestive. A possible explanation for this is twofold. First, looking specifically at the West 
reduces the number of cases significantly. Second, the West attained high development levels many 
decades ago, and it is possible that the institutional features that made it possible to achieve those 
levels are different from those that have at least in the short term maintained the West's lead in 
development levels. 
The results of the analysis suggest one general and one tax compliance-specific conclusion. The 
general conclusion that can be drawn is that historical development levels have a significant impact 
on present-day development level when other factors are controlled for. This suggests that it is 
probably the periods of rapid development in more developed countries that could serve as a mod-
el for institutional reform in less developed countries, not the current institutional make-up of the 
currently developed countries whose current development levels undoubtedly reflect past develop-
ment performance and governance. Not even Denmark knows how to ‘get to Denmark’ today (cf. 
Fukuyama 2011: 14). 
With regards to state capacity as measured by tax compliance it has an effect on human develop-
ment across the world, especially outside of the West, in the manner suggested by theory. While tax 
compliance might not correlate as highly with human development as other governance indicators, 
its parsimony and theoretical grounding does make it more clear what it measures. This suggests 
that beyond appearing to be valid, the indicator is analytically useful. 
Qualitative Test: China and India Development 
The proposed indicator for state capacity has been tested for validity and explanatory power in a 
quantitative test. Here it is tested on a critical case: China’s development performance. It should 
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ideally be able to better account for China’s development than other governance indicators, accord-
ing to which China’s development performance in inexplicable.  
Historical human development levels have a considerable effect on present-day development levels. 
This means that they should ideally be controlled for in studies of development performance. From 
this perspective China and India is uniquely interesting in a comparative study. When China and 
India were founded in 1949 and 1947 their development levels were almost the same. Life expec-
tancy was slightly longer in China, while literacy was slightly higher in India. Thirty years later, in 
1979, China’s HDI was 12% higher than India’s, and by 2010 it was 27% higher (figure 1).  
There is every reason to be skeptical of historical statistics such as these, especially in developing 
countries where less-than-stellar results were not always appreciated. However, speaking in favor of 
the approximate correctness of these numbers is that China’s performance in the three dimensions 
of the HDI is steady across the decades for which the UN has statistics. This steady, continued 
development trend across four decades lends credence to the direction and relative difference in 
 
Figure 1. From nearly the same starting point in 1950, China has been able to realize a higher development than India. 
Note: 1950 HDI is calculated using the pre-2010 methodology while the 2010 Hybrid HDI is calculated using the new methodology but the. 
1950 GDP per Capita is in 1990 Int. USD, while the 2009 data is PPP-adjusted. 
Source: Crafts 1996; UNDP 2010. 
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development performance if not the absolute values of any one year (figure 2).  
Because the two countries are largely similar - similar size, similar population levels, suffered similar 
trauma at their founding as constituent regions sought independence, and the respective govern-
ments having initially pursued similar state-led socialist development policies - this diverging devel-
opment performance is noteworthy. Furthermore, regional and interpersonal inequalities appear to 
be comparable if not similar. Where the two differ, especially in terms of development policy, it is 
theoretically in India’s favor as it pursued democracy and a mixed-market model rather than au-
thoritarian communist policies. 
Qualitative studies suggest that one of the critical differences between the two countries is the abil-
ity of the respective central government to mobilize resources to meet policy goals. At the founding 
the leaders of the respective central governments had similar development ambitions, if anything 
India’s were more focused on development outcome, which suggests that the divergence in devel-
opment performance is likely best explained by capacity not ambition (Cf. Nehru 1973: 397; Mao 
1949). 
Figure 2. By 1970 China and India’s human development level had diverged. This divergence has continued over the following 40 years. 
Source: UNDP 2010. 
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The Indian National Congress, the INC, the party which for decades dominated the central gov-
ernment under Gandhi and then Nehru and his successors, was from the founding of the country 
onwards a blunt instrument for the social reform its successive leaders sought (Kohli 1989: 57-58): 
The ideology and the organization of a weak nationalist movement [such as the INC] precludes the use of an essen-
tial political resource, compulsion, either to resist concerted opposition from strategic social groups or to implement its 
redistributive goals. … Enmeshed into the existing social structure, the INC was incapable of generating an autono-
mous political force to confront and reform this social structure. 
In a study on India’s economic development, Vivek Chibber seems to echo Kohli’s evaluation of 
the INC in his own assessment of the Indian state (Chibber 2003: 162): 
...the overall weakness of [Indian] industrial policy was generated by a lack of capacity in the two tasks that are 
central to a developmental state: the capacity to impose discipline on state agencies around a coherent project and the 
capacity to discipline private capital into abiding by that project. 
China, by contrast, had only years after its modern founding fully penetrated and reorganized socie-
ty. A major land reform that removed a traditional locus of power was quickly carried out, women 
were given the right to initiate divorce and hold land, and the remnants of the old Guomindang ad-
ministration were integrated into the CCP state (Spence 1991: 516-519). The new state instituted 
extensive social control, with street-committees composed of neighbors responsible for social ser-
vices, such as street-cleaning, health and vaccination programs, night schools, as well as public se-
curity (Spence 1991: 518). To fully penetrate society and administer the new state the CCP needed 
new members, but it wanted to ensure that they would be effective and reliable. Mass campaigns 
were used to identify true believers with an ability to lead, and undesirables were identified by cata-
loging all citizens into different social categories (Spence 1991: 533-540). Though the decades of 
chaos that culminated in the Cultural Revolution severely damaged the capacity of the party-state 
apparatus, the damage does not seem to have been irreparable. The generation of leaders after Mao 
were able to reorganize and arguably reinvigorate the party as well as the state (Shue 1994: 73; 
Spence 1991: 691-692). 
Given China and India’s diverging development performance and the qualitative evidence that 
since the respective founding China’s political system has to a greater extent been able to formulate 
and implement development policy than India’s, it could be expected that China’s scores on various 
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governance indicators would be higher than India’s. This is however not the case. Indeed, set 
against China’s development performance its scores are inexplicably low “in all of the available 
measures of quality of government“ (Rothstein 2012: 3). Compared to India’s, China’s scores are 
consistently worse on almost any given governance indicator even as its development performance 
is, and has been, consistently better (table 5).  
Two conclusions can be drawn from China’s performance on governance indicators. The first is 
that governance in China is not good. This conclusion is, however, highly problematic (Mahbubani 
2013): 
[China’s government] is not perfect but it has lifted more people out of poverty, educated more people, increased their 
lifespans and generated the world’s largest middle class. No other society in human history has improved human 
welfare as much as the Chinese government. It would be insane to deny that China has enjoyed “good governance”. 
The second, more defensible, conclusion that could be drawn is that these indicators are not able to 
capture some critical aspect of governance in general, and the Chinese political system in particular. 
Matt Andrews in an article about the GE argued that “the good governance agenda suggests a one-
best-way model, ostensibly of an idyllic, developed country government: Sweden or Denmark on a 
good day, perhaps” (Andrews 2008: 379). From this perspective China’s poor scores relative India’s 
are understandable; the Indian political system has more in common with that of  ‘Sweden or 
Denmark on a good day’ than the Chinese.  
Table 5. According to most indicators there is little difference between China and India’s governance, the difference being generally in India’s 
favor. State capacity measured by tax compliance tells another story. In the same way that China’s development level is decisively higher than 
India’s, so is its tax compliance greater. 
Source: Teorell et al. 2013; UNDP 2010. 
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Of the governance indicators surveyed in table 5, only state capacity operationalized as tax compli-
ance seems to show the sort of difference in capacity to provide public services that area studies 
and development performance suggest should exist. Normalizing all indicators, China decisively 
outperforms India on human development and tax compliance (figure 3). While the GE does show 
an appreciable difference in China’s favor, the problems with measurement validity means that it is 
not clear what this represents. Furthermore, once the indicators have been normalized China’s 
performance on GE relative that of India’s is not nearly as large as the difference in development 
performance.  
The size and complexity of China and India is such that this short overview clearly cannot do justi-
ce to the state-building or human development of the two countries. Regional, and ideally sub-
regional, state capacity as well as development performance needs to be accounted for in a more 
comprehensive analysis. What this limited comparative case study can do, and seems to accomplish, 
is to corroborate a level of difference in the state capacity of the two countries that development 
performance and more qualitative studies suggest. Of the governance indicators shown, only tax 
compliance is able to account for this apparent difference in state capacity, and resultant develop-
ment performance.  
 
Figure 3. Tax compliance is unique among governance indicators in that it shows the significant governance capacity edge for 
China over India that qualitative evidence and development performance suggests. 
Source: Teorell et al. 2013; UNDP 2010. 
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CONCLUSION 
Using Adcock and Collier’s 4-step framework as a guide to ensure measurement validity state ca-
pacity a systematized conceptualization of state capacity was derived from the background concept 
of the state. This systematized concept, with the state defined as the ability of the state to dominate, i.e. 
coax compliant behavior from, the individuals of a given territory, was then operationalized as tax compliance. 
Using the size of the shadow economy in 160 countries, the tax compliance was calculated. This 
operationalization was then tested in three ways. First, the convergent and discriminant validity of 
the state capacity indicator was tested. Second, the usefulness of state capacity in large-n output 
analyses, such as those in the good governance/quality of governance literature, was tested. Finally, 
the new indicator was used in a qualitative comparison between China and India where existing 
governance indicators are unable to capture what qualitative evidence and development perfor-
mance suggests is a difference in state capacity in China’s favor. 
The first test suggests that state capacity as tax compliance has both convergent and discriminant 
validity. It correlates highly with existing measures of effective government, especially, GE, suggest-
ing convergent validity. The correlation with output measures, such as human development, is 
weaker in the way theory would suggest it should be. The correlation with democracy is quite low 
outside of the West, which is also in accordance with theory. Furthermore, the relationship between 
state capacity and democracy is lower than for any of the other governance indicators. The lower 
relationships between tax compliance and an output measure and democracy supports the discrimi-
nant validity of the proposed indicator. 
In the second test, wherein state capacity is used as an independent variable, the indicator also be-
haves as theory would suggest it should. It has a significant effect on development levels, especially 
as other, more diffuse governance indicators as well as historical development levels are controlled 
for. Furthermore, because of the high content validity, it is clear exactly what the state capacity 
indicator is a measure of. This separates it from other, more nebulous governance indicators such 
as the WGI’s. 
Finally, applied to the critical case of China, the proposed indicator is able to substantiate a differ-
ence in governance capacity between China and India that qualitative evidence and development 
performance suggest should be there, but existing governance indicators do not capture. While this 
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is of course not the conclusive solution to the ‘Puzzle with China’ (Rothstein 2012), it is suggestive 
of a solution. 
The proposed indicator of state capacity, defined narrowly as dominance and operationalized as tax 
compliance, seems promising. It appears to have measurement validity, as well as being analytically 
useful. While this does not fully answer Fukuyama’s call for a conceptualization of governance as a 
whole, it does, perhaps, offer a piece of the puzzle. 
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Appendix A: 2003-2007 Average of Shadow Economy and Tax 
Compliance 
No. Country Shadow Economy Tax Compliance 
1 Switzerland 8.460 0.922 
2 United States 8.520 0.921 
3 Luxembourg 9.660 0.912 
4 Austria 9.700 0.912 
5 Japan 10.700 0.903 
6 Macao, China 11.860 0.894 
7 New Zealand 12.080 0.892 
8 United Kingdom 12.360 0.890 
9 China 12.400 0.890 
10 Singapore 12.640 0.888 
11 Netherlands 13.180 0.884 
12 Australia 13.700 0.880 
13 Vietnam 14.800 0.871 
14 France 14.840 0.871 
15 Iceland 15.300 0.867 
16 Canada 15.480 0.866 
17 Hong Kong, China 15.500 0.866 
18 Ireland 15.660 0.865 
19 Germany 15.860 0.863 
20 Mongolia 17.060 0.854 
21 Finland 17.360 0.852 
22 Bahrain 17.433 0.852 
23 Denmark 17.460 0.851 
24 Saudi Arabia 17.520 0.851 
25 Slovak Republic 17.600 0.850 
26 Czech Republic 17.840 0.849 
27 Iran, Islamic Rep. 17.840 0.849 
28 Jordan 17.940 0.848 
  35 
29 Oman 18.075 0.847 
30 Sweden 18.380 0.845 
31 Norway 18.440 0.844 
32 Quatar 18.467 0.844 
33 Kuwait 18.525 0.844 
34 Indonesia 18.540 0.844 
35 Chile 18.920 0.841 
36 Syrian Arab Republic 18.920 0.841 
37 India 21.580 0.823 
38 Belgium 21.660 0.822 
39 Israel 21.700 0.822 
40 Mauritius 22.320 0.818 
41 Spain 22.380 0.817 
42 Portugal 23.120 0.812 
43 Hungary 23.980 0.807 
44 Taiwan 24.500 0.803 
45 Argentina 24.680 0.802 
46 United Arab Emirates 25.000 0.800 
47 Costa Rica 25.320 0.798 
48 Slovenia 25.680 0.796 
49 Korea, Rep. 26.220 0.792 
50 South Africa 26.520 0.790 
51 Bahamas, The 26.700 0.789 
52 Poland 26.820 0.789 
53 Yemen, Rep. 26.840 0.788 
54 Greece 26.860 0.788 
55 Italy 26.960 0.788 
56 Malta 27.180 0.786 
57 Cyprus 27.560 0.784 
58 Bhutan 28.320 0.779 
59 Latvia 28.340 0.779 
60 Lao PDR 28.900 0.776 
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61 Maldives 29.120 0.774 
62 Namibia 29.460 0.772 
63 Mexico 29.700 0.771 
64 Lesotho 29.820 0.770 
65 Turkey 30.280 0.768 
66 Malaysia 30.380 0.767 
67 Estonia 30.460 0.767 
68 Equatorial Guinea 30.640 0.765 
69 Lithuania 30.960 0.764 
70 Brunei Darussalam 30.980 0.763 
 World Average 32.488 0.762 
71 Ecuador 31.200 0.762 
72 Croatia 31.260 0.762 
73 Romania 31.480 0.761 
74 Algeria 31.500 0.760 
75 Cameroon 31.540 0.760 
76 Dominican Republic 31.540 0.760 
77 Fiji 31.880 0.758 
78 Kenya 32.320 0.756 
79 Botswana 32.540 0.754 
80 Lebanon 32.560 0.754 
81 Trinidad and Tobago 32.560 0.754 
82 Libya 32.960 0.752 
83 Bosnia & Herzegovina 33.200 0.751 
84 Jamaica 33.540 0.749 
85 Solomon Islands 33.560 0.749 
86 Albania 33.640 0.748 
87 Venezuela, RB 33.640 0.748 
88 Guyana 33.880 0.747 
89 Morocco 34.060 0.746 
90 Sudan 34.100 0.746 
91 Bulgaria 34.160 0.745 
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92 Mauritania 34.250 0.745 
93 Egypt, Arab Rep. 34.480 0.744 
94 Pakistan 34.760 0.742 
95 Togo 34.875 0.741 
96 Cape Verde 34.880 0.741 
97 Bangladesh 34.960 0.741 
98 Colombia 35.940 0.736 
99 Tunisia 36.460 0.733 
100 Suriname 36.500 0.733 
101 Nepal 36.540 0.732 
102 Macedonia 36.720 0.731 
103 Papua New Guinea 36.980 0.730 
104 Ethiopia 37.560 0.727 
105 Brazil 38.200 0.724 
106 Paraguay 38.250 0.723 
107 Comoros 38.480 0.722 
108 Guinea 38.760 0.721 
109 Mozambique 39.250 0.718 
110 Burundi 39.620 0.716 
111 Swaziland 39.625 0.716 
112 Niger 39.675 0.716 
113 Ghana 39.720 0.716 
114 Kazakhstan 39.760 0.716 
115 Kyrgyz Republic 39.800 0.715 
116 Rwanda 39.825 0.715 
117 Burkina Faso 39.880 0.715 
118 Mali 40.080 0.714 
119 Philippines 40.300 0.713 
120 Eritrea 40.800 0.710 
121 Madagascar 40.820 0.710 
122 Tajikistan 41.500 0.707 
123 GuineaBissau 41.640 0.706 
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124 Uganda 41.680 0.706 
125 Malawi 41.840 0.705 
126 Belize 42.020 0.704 
127 Chad 42.140 0.704 
128 Russian Federation 42.260 0.703 
129 Armenia 42.680 0.701 
130 Senegal 42.800 0.700 
131 Gambia, The 43.220 0.698 
132 Sri Lanka 43.240 0.698 
133 Nicaragua 43.920 0.695 
134 Sierra Leone 44.000 0.694 
135 Moldova 44.075 0.694 
136 El Salvador 44.280 0.693 
137 Liberia 44.800 0.691 
138 Angola 45.100 0.689 
139 Congo, Rep. 45.120 0.689 
140 Belarus 45.160 0.689 
141 Zambia 45.900 0.685 
142 Central African Republic 46.420 0.683 
143 Cote d'lvoire 46.440 0.683 
144 Congo, Dem. Rep. 46.860 0.681 
145 Honduras 47.140 0.680 
146 Gabon 47.700 0.677 
147 Cambodia 47.720 0.677 
148 Ukraine 48.080 0.675 
149 Myanmar 48.633 0.673 
150 Thailand 49.100 0.671 
151 Benin 49.460 0.669 
152 Guatemala 49.660 0.668 
153 Uruguay 49.700 0.668 
154 Nigeria 54.550 0.647 
155 Tanzania 55.280 0.644 
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156 Azerbaijan 56.080 0.641 
157 Peru 56.620 0.638 
158 Haiti 57.000 0.637 
159 Panama 62.400 0.616 
160 Zimbabwe 62.600 0.615 
161 Georgia 64.440 0.608 
162 Bolivia 65.040 0.606 
 
